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Abstract
During recent years there has been an increasing awareness of the explanatory power
of demographic variables in economic growth regressions. We estimate a new model of
the e®ects of age structure change on economic growth. We use the new model and
recent probabilistic demographic projections for India to derive the uncertainty of pre-
dicted economic growth rates caused by the uncertainty in demographic developments.
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11 Introduction
During recent years there has been an increasing awareness of a direct in°uence of population
age structure on the macroeconomy. The theoretical foundations of the reduced form models
applied in econometric studies are: (1) the life cycle model of savings and investment and (2)
age speci¯c variations in labor productivity. Recently, Bloom et al. (2003b) argues that a
falling youth dependency ratio (the population below working age divided by the population
of working age) contributed to the economic growth miracle in East Asia (see also, among
others, Mason (2001)). More general, recent evidence suggests that falling youth dependency
ratios in developing countries can create an opportunity for economic growth. Bloom et
al. (2001), Bloom & Williamson (1998), Crenshaw et al. (1997), Kelley & Schmidt (1995),
Kelley & Schmidt (2001) show empirical support for this claim by ¯nding a positive and
signi¯cant e®ect of declining youth dependency ratios on economic growth in cross-country
regressions applied to developing and developed countries. Signi¯cant age structure e®ects
have also been found for economic growth, in°ation and savings in OECD countries (Lindh
(1999), Lindh &Malmberg (1999), Malmberg (1994)).
Except in the work by Bloom & Williamson (1998) and Lindh (1999) the implications of
this evidence have not yet been discussed. Lindh (1999) presents evidence that statistical
models of in°ation and GDP growth explained mainly by the share of 5-year age groups
perform well in out-of-sample forecasting on a horizon of 3-5 years ahead during the 1990s. A
di®erent methodology is used in Bloom & Williamson (1998). The authors use the estimated
coe±cients on population growth rates and growth rates of the economically active population
(15-64 old age group) | as estimated by a cross-county regression of economic growth applied
to 78 developing and developed countries | to assess the past (1965-1990) and forecast the
future (1990-2025) contribution of demographic change on economic growth. Their results
indicate \that population dynamics can explain between 1:37 and 1:87 percentage points of
growth in GDP per capita in East Asia or as much as one-third of the miracle ..." (p.441,
where miracle refers to growth rate of GDP per capita of 6% observed over the same time
period in East Asia). For their forecasts the authors combine the estimated coe±cients on
the population variable with the medium variant of UN population projections. Their results
indicate that \in East Asia, the growth in GDP per capita attributable to demographic
in°uences is projected to be negative between 1990 and 2025, ...... a loss of 0.14 to 0.44
percentage point up to 2025". On the other hand countries in South Asia are projected to
gain from their demographic changes in the future.
We follow Bloom & Williamson (1998) here and forecast economic growth in developing
countries by combining the estimated coe±cients of a regression analysis of economic growth
with population projections. The contribution of this paper lies in our use of probabilistic
population projections instead of deterministic ones.
We use India as a case study for our approach. India is a country for which probabilistic
population projections are available (Lutz and Scherbov 2004). In addition, India is an ideal
country for our purpose since it has not yet had the dramatic fall in youth dependency (which
we observe for many of the Asian countries) and which has not yet had a very dramatic
increase in the elderly dependency ratio (Dyson, Cassen and Visaria (2004)). Recently a
survey of India in The Economist (2004, p.13) argues similarly: 'The most fundamental
long-term reason for optimism is demographic.' This paper provides a partial test of this
hypothesis.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss the role of de-
mographic variables in explaining economic growth. In section 3 we show the results of a
cross-country regression of economic growth applied to developing and developed countries.
2Section 4 reviews recent applications of probabilistic demographic projections in economics.
Section 5 combines the probabilistic demographic forecasts for India with the estimates ob-
tained from the growth regression. The ¯nal section concludes.
2 The role of demographic variables in explaining eco-
nomic growth
According to the neoclassical growth model population growth reduces economic growth due
to capital dilution. However, various studies using cross-country data found an insigni¯cant
e®ect of population growth on economic growth. Recently, Bloom & Williamson (1998)
challenged this result (see also Bloom et al. (2001)). They con¯rm that population growth
has no e®ect on economic growth in growth equations with the growth rate of the total
population as the only demographic variable. However, they show that demography matters
for economic growth, once one considers changes in the age structure of the population, that
is, once one drops the implicit assumption of a constant age composition of the population.
More speci¯cally, the authors regress the growth rate of GDP per capita on the growth rate
of the working age population and the growth rate of the total population (and various other
control variables). The results show a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on the growth of GDP
per capita due to the growth of the working age population, and an opposite, negative and
signi¯cant e®ect from the growth rate of the total population.
Since World War II developing countries have been undergoing a demographic transition
at varying rates and times (Lee (2003)). During the standard demographic transition scenario
infant mortality declines and fertility falls with a lag only after the mortality decline has
begun. As a consequence, a demographic transition leads ¯rst to a demographic \burden"
because population growth is faster than the growth of the working age population. Later,
as fertility declines, the demographic transition leads to a demographic \dividend" because
the growth of the working age population is faster than the growth of the total population
(cf. Bloom et al. (2003b)).
Bloom & Williamson (1998) use the quantitative results of their cross-country regressions
to calculate the contribution of age structure changes to East Asian economic growth (see
the discussion in the introduction). According to their view, the demographic \dividend"
leads to opportunities for growth of output per capita for two reasons. First, there is an
accounting e®ect because a rising ratio of the working age population to the total population
increases the ratio of \producers" to \consumers". Obviously this contributes positively to
the growth of output per capita. Second, there might also exist behavioral e®ects on the
growth of output per capita. As Bloom & Williamson (1998) stresses, a rising growth rate of
the working age population leads, on the one hand, to capital dilution, that is, a reduction
of the ratio of capital to the working age population. On the other hand, a rising ratio of the
working age population to the total population implies a falling dependency ratio. Bloom et
al. (2003a), using aggregate data of developing and developed countries, shows that a falling
dependency ratio increases aggregate savings (see, among others Kelley & Schmidt (1996)).
Mathematically the accounting e®ect and the behavioral e®ects can be decomposed from
the following identity that results from taking the natural logarithm of output per capita and
di®erentiating the resulting expression with respect to time. This yields
^ y = ^ ~ y + ^ l (1)
where y = Y=N; ~ y = Y=L;l = L=N and Y denotes total output. Further, N denotes the
population and L denotes the working age population and a \hat" on top of a variable
3indicates the growth rate. (A comprehensive review of the recent economic-demographic
modelling and the role of accounting e®ects can be found in Kelley & Schmidt (2003)). The
growth rate of output per working age person, ^ ~ y, contains the behavioral e®ects, while the
term ^ l, which equals the di®erence between the growth rate of the working age population
and the growth rate of the total population, is the accounting e®ect.
While Bloom & Williamson (1998) focuses on output per capita as the dependent variable,
the recent literature argues that an understanding of international di®erences in output per
worker is needed, since only workers contribute to production. Since forecasts of labor force
participation rates are di±cult and lie outside the scope of the paper, changes of output
per worker are approximated here by changes in output per working age person. Most
importantly, as can be seen from (1), the growth rate of output per capita contains behavioral
e®ects, as well as, an accounting e®ect from age structure changes. Hence, from regressions
with the growth rate of output per capita as the dependent variable it is rather complicated
to assess behavioral e®ects (see Bloom et al. (2001) for an assessment of behavioral e®ects
from such regressions). In contrast, the growth rate of output per working age person is
free of an accounting e®ect. Hence, all age structure e®ects in regressions with the growth
rate of output per working age person as the dependent variable are behavioral e®ects. In
addition, the accounting e®ect can be calculated directly from calculating the di®erence
between the growth rates of the working age population and the growth rate of the total
population, with no need of regressions. For this reason, we estimated behavioral e®ects
by regressing the growth of output per working age person on its determinants and have
calculated the accounting e®ect directly without the use of regression exercises (see some
regressions in Kelley & Schmidt (2003) for a similar estimation strategy and KÄ ogel (2003) for
the estimation of behavioral e®ects using regressions on the growth of output per worker).
3 Results of economic growth regressions
Economic growth regressions su®er from estimation biases due to measurement errors and
omitted variables such as the initial level of technology. Biases from omitted variables can
be avoided by applying the ¯xed e®ects estimator or the Arellano-Bond estimator to pooled
time-series and cross-country data. However, as Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) stress, the ¯xed
e®ects estimator or the Arellano-Bond estimator exacerbate measurement error biases when
the right-hand side variables are more time persistent than the measurement errors.1 Using
Monte Carlo simulations, the authors ¯nd that using the OLS estimator applied to a single
cross-section of variables averaged over some decades contains fewer biases than the ¯xed
e®ects estimator or the Arellano-Bond estimator. For this reason, we used regressions applied
to 97 developing and developed countries averaged over the time period between 1960 and
1995. (The de¯nition and data sources of the variables in the regressions are shown in
Appendix A, while a list of countries included in the analysis is shown in Appendix B).
Based on the conditional convergence hypothesis, we included the natural logarithm of
output per working age person in 1960 as an independent variable a®ecting average annual
growth of output per working age person.2 If negative and signi¯cant, then the coe±cient of
1The problem of time persistent independent variables and measurement errors is particularly relevant for
our study where we choose slow moving demographic variables and variables that measure social infrastructure
as independent variables. While the former set of variables is time persistent, the latter variable is often °awed
by measurement errors. Since ¯xed e®ects models aim to capture the time variation in independent variables,
application of this method to our data would imply that we might capture measurement errors (which are
more time varying) of social infrastructure instead of the demographic e®ects and the institutional context
as measured by the social infrastructure variable.
2Henceforth, the average annual growth rate of a variable x in country i is de¯ned as (1=35)(lnxi;1995 ¡
4this variable indicates the tendency of convergence of output per working age person to a
value that is in the steady state the same for all countries, provided all countries have the
same value for their control variables.
We initially followed Bloom & Williamson (1998) and Hall and Jones (1999) in controlling
for social infrastructure with indicators of the quality of institutions and openness to trade.
However, we could not ¯nd strong instrumental variables for those indicators. Therefore, we
used somewhat di®erent indicators for which we found stronger instruments. We followed
Rodrik et al. (2002) and used the indicator of rule of law in Kaufman et al. (2003), abbrevi-
ated RULE. The updated indicator is available for 1996-2002. Since our sample ends in 1995,
we used the indicator for 1996. RULE is a composite indicator that measures protection af-
forded to property rights and the strength of the rule of law.3 Instead of using the Sachs and
Warner (1995) index of the average years of openness to trade, we again followed Rodrik et
al. (2002) in using the natural logarithm of the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to
output in current international dollars, henceforth abbreviated lnCOPEN, as our measure of
openness to trade. We followed Hall & Jones (1999) in calculating a composite indicator for
social infrastructure, abbreviated SOCINF, as the average value of the indicators for quality
of institutions (in our case RULE) and for openness to trade (in our case lnCOPEN). As
Hall & Jones (1999) stresses, doing so imposes the restriction that the coe±cients for RULE
and lnCOPEN are the same, which we were able to con¯rm empirically (results not shown).
In our view, including the composite of the two variables solves the problem of strong multi-
collinearity between them. This multicollinearity shows that countries that have high quality
institutions are also more open to trade.
We also included the level of the youth dependency ratio as measured by the population
younger than 15 divided by the population aged ¯fteen to sixty-four. The motivation for
including the level of age structure and not its growth rate is the fact that, at least in
the transition to a steady state, growth of output per working age person is a®ected by
the level of savings. In turn, Bloom et al. (2003a) have empirically con¯rmed that the
level of savings is a®ected by the level of age structure variables and not their growth rates
(Kelley & Schmidt (2003) and KÄ ogel (2003) independently suggest including only the level
of youth dependency ratio for this reason). Nevertheless, in the analysis that follows we also
investigated empirically, whether our hypothesis that growth of youth dependency ratio does
not matter for growth of output per working age person ¯nds empirical support. We included
only the youth dependency ratio in the regression equation, because the elderly dependency
ratio turned out to be insigni¯cant for growth of output per working age person.
The ¯rst column in Table 1 shows the results of an OLS regression of the (annual average)
growth rate of output per working age person on the natural logarithm of initial output per
working age person, SOCINF and the natural logarithm of the youth dependency ratio.4 As
expected, the results show a negative and signi¯cant e®ect of the youth dependency ratio. In
addition, the coe±cient of output per working age person is negative and signi¯cant, while
the coe±cient of social infrastructure is positive and signi¯cant.
In the second column in Table 1 we included the (annual average) growth rates of the
working age population and of the total population as further independent variables. Both
new variables are signi¯cant. (When the growth rate of the youth dependency ratio is included
lnxi;1960), where for example xi;1995 denotes the value of x in country i in the year 1995.
3Using RULE helped identi¯cation of the partial economic growth e®ects of social infrastructure in com-
parison with age structure, because the best instruments that we could ¯nd for RULE are less strongly
correlated with age structure than the best instruments that we could ¯nd for the preferred indicator used
in Bloom & Williamson (1998) and Hall & Jones (1999).
4All regressions in Table 1 contain White-Huber heteroscedasticity-consistent p-values, reported in paren-
theses below the coe±cient estimates.
5instead it also has a statistically signi¯cant coe±cient - not shown). In the third model
(column (3) in Table 1) we further add the natural logarithm of the average life expectancy
at birth between 1960-65 and 1990-95. This can be justi¯ed with the ¯nding of Bloom et
al. (2003a) that rising life expectancy boosts aggregate savings. Life expectancy turns out
to be positive and signi¯cant, as expected. In addition, the growth rate of the working-age
population and the growth rate of the total population become insigni¯cant when we control
for life expectancy (see also Kelley & Schmidt (2003)). The fact that the p-value of the youth
dependency ratio falls to seven percent when we control for life expectancy is very likely due
to some multicollinearity between the youth dependency ratio and life expectancy. In the
fourth column in Table 1 we exclude the growth rates of the working age population and the
total population but keep life expectancy. The fact that the value of the coe±cient of the
youth dependency ratio falls from -2.41 in Model 1 (column 1) to -1.08 in Model 4 (column
4) is an indication that the youth dependency ratio in Model 1 partly captures the e®ect of
life expectancy.
[Table 1 about here.]
Recent literature (and most prominently Hall & Jones (1999)) argues that indicators for
quality of institutions contain measurement errors. Moreover, because of feedback e®ects
from the level of output per working-age person or its growth rate, the indicators for quality
of institutions and openness for trade might be endogenous. For this reason, Hall & Jones
(1999) suggest instrumenting the indicator for social infrastructure. We follow the authors
to use the predicted trade share of Frankel and Romer (1999), abbreviated lnFrankRom, as
an instrument for our indicator of openness in SOCINF. As second instrument for SOCINF
we choose English legal origin, abbreviated EngLegal, as taken from La Porta et al. (1999).
To allow for the possibility that the youth dependency ratio is endogenous, we applied
IV estimation with the youth dependency ratio being instrumented, as well. For the set of
instruments for the youth dependency ratio we chose the following four variables for ecozones,
as taken from the data appendix of Gallup et al. (1999): ztropics (percent of land in a
tropical zone), zsubtropics (percent of land in a subtropical zone), zdestmp (percent of land
in a temperate desert zone) and zdestrp (percent of land in a tropical or subtropical desert
zone).
The ¯rst column in Table 2 shows the IV regression results. (In Table 2 we did not
correct for heteroscedasticity, because tests for heteroscedasticity (White test and Breusch-
Pagan test) could not reject homoscedasticity). Again, the coe±cient of initial output per
working-age person is negative and signi¯cant, while SOCINF is positive and signi¯cant.
Most importantly, the coe±cient of the youth dependency ratio remains negative and signif-
icant. Because of space limitation we refrain from showing the ¯rst-stage regression results.5
To show the consequences of applying IV estimation, we proceed with a comparison of
the regression results of IV estimation (column 1, Table 2) with the OLS regression results
(column 1, Table 1). One can see that IV estimation leads to a larger coe±cient for the youth
dependency ratio. For SOCINF the magnitude of the coe±cient falls and the magnitude of
the coe±cient of initial output per working-age person is almost una®ected.
Regression (1) does not contain life expectancy at birth. It is very likely that life ex-
pectancy is a®ected by economic growth and therefore endogenous, as well. For this reason,
5We applied for the IV estimation the Fuller's method of modi¯ed limited-information maximum like-
lihood (LIML). Stock et al. (2002) and Hahn and Hausman (2003) suggest this estimation method when
instruments are weak. Among other possible reasons, instruments can be weak when the instruments have
strong explanatory power for both endogenous variables.
6we also applied IV estimation to the ln of average life expectancy at birth. As an instrument
for life expectancy we chose the variable ln of one plus malaria ecology, abbreviated ME. ME
is an ecologically-based variable that is predictive of the extent of malaria transmission and
is taken from Kiszewski et al. (2004). The second column in Table 2 shows the regression
results where we applied IV estimation to SOCINF, ln of youth dependency ratio and ln of
life expectancy. The coe±cients of all right-hand side variables have the expected sign and
are signi¯cant. Compared to the OLS regressions in column 4 in Table 1 the coe±cients on
the youth dependency ratio and on life expectancy are smaller indicating a feedback e®ect
from economic growth to life expectancy and the youth dependency ratio. Furthermore, a
comparison across model 1 and model 2 in Table 2 shows that the coe±cient on the youth
dependency ratio declines by almost ¯fty per cent once we control for life expectancy pointing
to a high correlation between the variables(indeed, the correlation coe±cient between the ln
of the youth dependency ratio and the ln of life expectancy has in in our sample the value
-0.72).
[Table 2 about here.]
4 Applications of probabilistic demographic projec-
tions in economics
One common approach to quantifying the uncertainty in future outcomes of economic and
demographic variables is the use of scenarios. It starts by constructing alternative trajectories
(commonly referred to as low, medium and high variants) for the various inputs into the
forecasting model. The next step is then to 'bundle combinations of these trajectories together
to calculate high, medium and low projection "scenarios". The way the bundling is done
depends on the purpose of the projections, and has an important in°uence on the results.'
(Lee & Edwards (2001, p.6)).
For instance consider the population projections by United Nations (2003) (also used by
Bloom & Williamson (1998)). The UN provides three main projections, labelled as low,
medium and high variants. The low, medium and high scenarios only di®er with respect to
their fertility assumptions (see United Nations (2003) for further details). The assumptions
are set in order to highlight the e®ects that di®erent fertility paths have on demographic
outcomes. According to Lee & Edwards (2001, p.6) not only does the scenario based approach
not assign any probability to its alternative variants but the approach is seriously °awed with
respect to several of its assumptions.
During the last decade several authors have developed stochastic population forecasts
(see Lee (1998) for a review of probabilistic approaches to population forecasting). While
alternative approaches di®er with respect to the methodology that generates the input vectors
for the projection model (e.g. time series modelling versus expert opinions are used to yield
future time paths of fertility and mortality), the ultimate aim of those methods is the same:
to derive prediction intervals for future realizations of population numbers or more general
population functionals such as the dependency ratios.
In recent years several authors (Lee & Edwards (2001), Tuljapurkar (1992)) have also
started to apply stochastic population forecasts in economics and environmental studies
(O'Neill (2003)). E.g. Lee and Edwards (2001) apply stochastic population forecasts to
predict the ¯scal impact of population ageing in the US and to assess its uncertainty. Spe-
ci¯c applications include stochastic projections for social security, stochastic projections for
7medicare costs and stochastic projections of the balance in the Social Security Trust fund (all
applied for the USA). Stochastic simulations are applied to generate the stochastic forecasts
for the quantity of interest. For example to forecast the balance of the Social Security Trust
Fund one combines the stochastic population forecasts with forecasts of economic variables
(like productivity changes and changes in the interest rate) and applies those to the mathe-
matical expression which yields the social security balance each time period. Each realization
of a demographic forecast and an economic forecast will yield one stochastic simulation tra-
jectory. After generating at least one thousand of those stochastic trajectories we can apply
a frequency distribution to the outcome variable of interest (the social security balance) to
estimate the probability distribution of the forecast. We shall proceed in a similar fashion in
section 5 where we combine the econometric results from the previous section with stochastic
forecasts of the population.
Let us try to translate the meaning of the probabilistic forecasts in terms of our research
question, long run economic growth forecasts. Demographic change is only one among a host
of factors in°uencing economic growth. Since we concentrate only on this one factor, we
cannot forecast the unconditional distribution of India's future rate of economic growth. We
can only report on the e®ects of demographic uncertainty on economic growth, conditional
on pre-speci¯ed values of SOCINF, our variables that summarizes the e®ects of all non-
demographic factors on economic growth. Conditional forecasted distributions of economic
growth rates can be used to answer questions such as `What is the probability that India in
2035 will surpass the growth rate in output per worker that has been achieved in 2000".6 We
can also consider how the conditional distribution of economic growth rates changes when
SOCINF changes. For example, below we study what would happen to economic growth
rates if India, by 2035, would be able to achieve the same level of SOCINF as observed in
Singapore in 2000 (the country with the highest value of SOCINF in 2000)? Clearly, this
sort of analysis is only a ¯rst step, but nevertheless, it may still help in the policy making
process.
5 Probabilistic demographic and long run economic
growth projections for India
To provide some context, we compare the past and projected youth dependency ratio of India
(according to the UN medium variant) with the age structure observed in Japan and Niger,
two countries at di®erent stages of their development as compared to India. Figure 1 shows
the youth dependency ratios (the population of age 0-15 divided by the economically active
population of age 15-64) for these three countries over the period 1960 to 2050.7 Clearly,
India's youth dependency ratio has been falling since 1970 and the UN forecasts that it will
fall until 2045. In contrast, Niger (one of the poorest countries of the world) has not yet been
experiencing a fall of the youth dependency ratio while Japan had its demographic transition
much earlier than India. It is important to note that the old age dependency ratio (the
number of people of age 65 and older divided by the number of people 15 to 64) in India
rises only modestly from 2000 to 2035 (compare United Nations (2003)) since our regression
speci¯cation does not include the old age dependency ratio as an independent variable.
[Figure 1 about here.]
6Since our estimation for the average annual growth rate of per working age person is based on a 35 year
interval we choose the same time horizon for our predictions.
7We add a vertical line at the year 2000 since this will constitute the starting period for our probabilistic
projections.
8In Figure 2 we plot percentiles of the probability distribution of the youth dependency
ratio based on Lutz and Scherbov (2004). During the ¯rst two decades the uncertainty in
the number of births and the uncertainty in the number of surviving people in the working
age population mainly determine the probability distribution. As the uncertain births start
to enter the denominator (working age population) the uncertainty in the youth dependency
ratio increases further. An additional broadening of the probability distribution results from
the uncertain fertility applied to uncertain numbers of young women in fertile ages. By 2050
there is a 2:5% chance that the youth dependency ratio will have fallen by 82% or more while
there is an equal chance that it will have fallen by 34% or less. Put di®erently, there is a 95%
chance that the youth dependency ratio will be between 0:10 and 0:36 in 2050 compared to
a value of 0:54 in 2000. The evolution of the probabilistic youth dependency ratios follows a
trajectory that is similar to the UN ratios in Figure 1, but because of di®erences in assump-
tions, the probabilistic forecasts of youth dependency ratios tend to be somewhat lower than
the UN forecasts.
[Figure 2 about here.]
In Figure 3 we plot the probabilistic projections for life expectancy at birth. According
to these projections the uncertainty in the projected life expectancy is substantial. With a
95% chance the life expectancy is predicted to be between 63 and 78 years in 2050 and this
range is reduced to between 68 and 74 years if we consider the 60% prediction interval. The
median value of life expectancy in 2050 is 71 years and therefore by 10 years above the value
currently observed in India (61 years in 2000).
[Figure 3 about here.]
In Figure 4 we plot the probabilistic projections for the accounting e®ect (the di®erence
between the growth rate of the working age population and the total population). Our
probabilistic projections indicate that the uncertainty about the future path of the accounting
e®ect is not negligible. In fact, there is an equal chance of 2:5% that the accounting e®ect
will be positive and exceed :4 or be negative and fall below ¡1 in the time period 2045-2050.
Note, however that the probability that the accounting will become negative before 2025 is
very small. This is because of the falling youth dependency ratio which implies that the ratio
of consumers to producers is falling during the next decades while the old age dependency
ratio does not change much. At the time when the smaller cohorts of children start entering
the labour force (around 2020 and 2030) the ratio of consumers to producers will increase
again and reduce the accounting e®ect.
[Figure 4 about here.]
As a next step we combine the probabilistic demographic projections of India with the
regression results from model (2) in Table 2 to predict an annual average growth rate be-
tween 2000 and 2035. More speci¯cally we draw one realization of the stochastic population
projections in 2035 and solve the following equation
¡8:69 + recal ¡ 1:56lny2000 ¡ 1:60lnY D + 0:83 SOCINF + 5:14lne0
where y indicates the output per working age person, Y D the youth dependency ra-
tio and e0 the life expectancy at birth with lnY D = 0:5[lnY D(2000) + lnY D(2035)],
lne0 = 0:5[lne0(2000) + lne0(2035)] and SOCINF is set equal to the value of SOCINF
observed in India in 2000. The constant recal (for recalibration) is the di®erence of the
9predicted and observed annual growth rate between 1995 and 2000. It essentially updates
the value of the constant SOCINF to the average value for 1995-2000. Note, however that
for the predicted value of average annual growth rates between 2000 and 2035 we keep the
level of the SOCINF constant and therefore will forecast a growth rate that is likely to be too
low. We assemble 1;000 stochastic simulations of the growth rate of output per working age
person and summarize the resulting probability distribution in Table 3, column (1). Note,
that we assume uncertainty only in the demographic variables and ignore any uncertainty
that is caused by the estimation procedure.
[Table 3 about here.]
Compared to the past experience of annual economic growth rates of 4:13 per cent between
1995 and 2000 our results indicate that there is about the same likelihood that the annual
growth rate of output per working age person between 2000 and 2035 will be either below or
above the growth rate of output per working age person reached in 1995¡2000. Recalling that
our structural equation used to forecast economic growth only includes three time varying
regressors | the lagged dependent variable, the youth dependency ratio and life expectancy
at birth | these results lend themselves to another interesting interpretation. In the median
path, the behavioral e®ect (represented by the youth dependency ratio and the life expectancy
at birth) will almost exactly counterbalance the negative convergence term and the growth
rate of output per working age person will remain close to 4:13 per cent, the value attained
at the beginning of our forecasting time period. On the other hand, projected growth rates
that are lower (higher) than 4:13 per cent imply that the convergence term dominates (is
dominated by) the behavioral e®ect.
In Table 3, column (1') we add to the uncertainty of the youth dependency ratio the
uncertainty of the accounting e®ect to arrive at predictions of output per capita. Our results
indicate that for each reported percentile the annual growth rate of per capita output between
2000 and 2035 will be about 0.4 percentage point larger compared to the annual growth rate
of output per working age person. This result can be explained by the fact that according to
our probabilistic predictions (Figure 3), the accounting e®ect will most likely stay positive
until 2020. More speci¯cally, our results indicate that there is a 95 per cent chance that the
predicted annual per capita output growth rate between 2000 and 2035 will be between 4.2
and 5.0 per cent (compared with a value of 4.5 per cent observed between 1995 and 2000).
We also have combined the probabilistic demographic projections with the regression
results in Table 1, column (4) to quantify the e®ect on predicted economic growth rates if
we ignore the endogeneity of demographic variables in the cross country regression. The
resulting percentiles are reported in the second column in Table 3. Predicted average annual
growth rates between 2000 and 2035 ignoring endogeneity are lower than when the e®ects
of endogeneity are controlled. Ignoring the endogeneity of the demographic variables implies
that the coe±cient on the life expectancy is upwards biased while the coe±cient on the youth
dependency ratio is downwards biased. This can be explained by the fact that these variables
are multicollinear and the endogeneity of life expectancy is greater than the endogeneity of
the youth dependency ratio. Hence, since the predicted gain in life expectancy is lower than
the predicted decrease in the youth dependency ratio, the predicted growth rate of output
per working age person is too low if we apply OLS estimates. Hence, applying instrumental
variable estimation turns out to be essential if we make predictions based on past e®ects of
demographic variables.
We may compare the conditional distribution of growth rates in the ¯rst column in Table 3
to the e®ect of a change in the variable SOCINF. If between 2000 and 2035 India's social
10infrastructure increased from its current level to the current level of Singapore (the country
with the highest social infrastructure in our world sample in 2000) the growth gain would be
about 1:18 per cent per year for the median value of the conditional distribution (cf. column
(3) in Table 3). Cumulated over 35 years this would imply a di®erence in the level of output
per working age person of almost 50 per cent between 2000 and 2035. More accurately, while
output per working age person would be predicted to increase by about 3:6 times the value
obtained in 2000 if the value of SOCINF stays constant at the value observed in India in
2000, output per working age person would be predicted to increase by about 5:4 times if
SOCINF would approach the value of Singapore by 2035.
Another interesting exercise is to see how long it would take India to reach the value
of output per working age person observed in 2000 in UK for example given the predicted
conditional growth rates of output per working age person in Table 3. The results are
summarized in Table 4 for growth rates based on column (1) and column (3) in Table 3.
Based on the median forecast, with the 1995-2000 level of SOCINF it would take 51 years for
India to reach the level of output per working age person experienced by the UK in the year
2000. If India has Singapore's value of SOCINF in 2035 it would take 41 years to achieve
that level of output per working age person.
Given that today's value of the social infrastructure is unchanged a di®erence of the
annual growth rate of about 0.72 percentage points (as observed between the 25th and 97.5th
percentile in column (1) in Table 3) would result in a di®erence of about 8.8 years that it
takes India to reach the level of the output per working age person of the UK. If however,
India would approach the value of SOCINF that currently prevails in Singapore, the time
it takes India to reach today's level of output per working age person of the UK is reduced
markedly. For the 25th percentile the di®erence among column (1) and column (2) in Table 4
is about 9 years. This di®erence increases to 12.2 years for the 97.5th percentile. These ¯gures
indicate that the uncertainty of predicted growth rates of output per working age person due
to uncertainty in demographic indicators is of about the same order as uncertainty due to
limited knowledge of the future path of the social infrastructure variable.
[Table 4 about here.]
6 Conclusion
We draw on recent literature that has shown that age structure may have an important e®ect
on economic growth. These e®ects work through a pure accounting e®ect (a change in the
ratio of producing to consuming people in an economy) and a behavioral e®ect which relates
to the change in output per working age person.
To assess the behavioral e®ect we applied a new cross-section estimation approach to data
of 97 developing and developed countries from 1965 to 1990. Our results indicate a negative
and signi¯cant e®ect of the youth dependency ratio and the output per working age person
in the base year and a positive and signi¯cant e®ect of social infrastructure. We have applied
instrumental variable methods to control for the endogeneity of demographic variables and
measurement errors in variables that capture the social infrastructure.
In a second step we combined the estimated coe±cients of the regression on economic
growth with probabilistic population projections of India to qualify the growth potential
embodied in India's changing age structure. If one considers only demographic uncertainty
we ¯nd that there is a 95 per cent chance that the predicted growth rate of output per
11working age person in 2035 will be between 3.8 and 4.6 percent compared to a value of 4.1
per cent in 1995-2000.
Changing India's social infrastructure variable from its value in 1995-2000 to the level
currently observed in Singapore increases the average rate of economic growth of output
per working age person by about 1 percentage point. La Porta et al. (1999) argues that
government performance improves with per capita income. Since in this case there would
be bi-directional causality, it would be infeasible to quantify a feedback e®ect from eco-
nomic growth to better social infrastructure. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the possibility
of improving social infrastructure, India's future economic growth might be faster than our
predictions that consider only the change in the age structure.
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15Appendix A: the data of the regressions in section 3
Output per working-age person (in constant international dollars of 1996 according to
the Laspeyres method)
Calculation: Multiplication of output per capita in constant international dollars of 1996
according to the Laspeyres method with total population and division by population of age
15-64.
Sources: Penn World Table 6.1 (PWT 6.1) (output per capita and total population) and
United Nations (2003) (population of age 15-64).
Youth dependency ratio
De¯nition: population of age 0-14 divided by population of age 15-64.
Source: United Nations (2003) .
RULE
De¯nition: indicator of rule of law.
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2003).
LnCOPEN
De¯nition: ln of the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to output in current international
dollars
Source: Penn World Table 6.1 (PWT 6.1).
Annual average growth of working-age population and of total population
De¯nition: working-age population is de¯ned as population of age 15-64.
Source: Penn World Table 6.1 (PWT 6.1).
Ln of life expectancy at birth
De¯nition: average of Ln of life expectancy at birth in 1960-65 and 1990-95.
Source: Penn World Table 6.1 (PWT 6.1).
ztropics, zsubtropics, zdestmp, zdestrp, zdrytemp, zwater
De¯nition: ecozones, which are: ztropics (percent of land in a tropical zone), zsubtropics
(percent of land in a subtropical zone), zdestmp (percent of land in a temperate desert zone)
and zdestrp (percent of land in a tropical or subtropical desert zone), zdrytemp (percent of
land of a country in a dry-temperate zone) and zwater (percent of the area of a country that
is lake or ocean)
Source: data appendix of Gallup et al. (1999) and personal information of John Gallup.
The percent of land of a country in the aforementioned zones was calculated by combining
information of country boundaries from ESRI (1996) with the thirty-seven Holdridge Life
Zones from Leemans (1990). Next, the resulting thirty-seven variables were aggregated into
the aforementioned broader categories.
LnFrankRom
De¯nition: predicted trade share of an economy.
Source: Frankel and Romer (1999) (available at Chad Jones' data archive at
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~chad/datasets.html)
EngLegal
De¯nition: dummy variable which takes the value one, if a country's legal origin is British
(and takes otherwise the value zero).
16Source: data appendix of LaPorta et al. (1999).
LnME
De¯nition: ln of an ecologically-based variable that is predictive of the extent of malaria
transmission.
Source: Kiszewski et al. (2004).
17Appendix B: list of countries included in data set of the regressions in section 3
Angola Egypt Kenya Portugal
Argentina Spain Korea, Rep. Paraguay
Australia Ethiopia Sri Lanka Romania
Austria Finland Lesotho Rwanda
Burundi France Morocco Senegal
Belgium Gabon Madagascar Singapore
Benin United Kingdom Mexico El Salvador
Burkina Faso Ghana Mali Sweden
Bangladesh Guinea Mozambique Syria
Bolivia Gambia, The Mauritania Chad
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Mauritius Togo
Botswana Greece Malawi Thailand
Central African Rep. Guatemala Malaysia Trinidad & Tobago
Canada Hong Kong Namibia Turkey
Switzerland Honduras Niger Uganda
Chile Haiti Nigeria Uruguay
China Indonesia Nicaragua USA
Cote d'Ivoire India Netherlands Venezuela
Cameroon Ireland Norway South Africa
Congo, Rep. Iran New Zealand Congo, Dem. Rep.
Colombia Israel Pakistan Zambia
Costa Rica Italy Panama Zimbabwe
Denmark Jamaica Peru
Dominican Rep. Jordan Philippines
Ecuador Japan Papua New Guinea
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24Table 1: Explaining annual average growth of output per working age person 1960-95, OLS
regression
Dependent variable: Annual average growth
rate of output per working-age person (x100)
Independent variables
Constant 6.02 7.04 -9.13 -12.79
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
Ln of output per wor- -1.01 -1.14 -1.61 -1.69
king age person 1960 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ln of youth depen- -2.41 -2.94 -1.58 -1.08
dency ratio (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01)
SOCINF 1.36 0.98 0.81 0.86
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00 )
Growth of the working- 2.43 0.86
age population (ann. average) (0.00) (0.18)
Growth of the total -2.29 -0.78
population (ann. average) (0.00) (0.27)
Ln of life expectancy 5.31 6.48
at birth (0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.46 0.60 0.69 0.68
Number of observations 97 97 97 97
a(White-Huber) heteroscedasticity{consistent p-values are reported in parentheses below the coe±cient esti-
mates.
25Table 2: Explaining annual average growth of output per working age person 1960-95, IV
estimation
Dependent variable: Annual average growth
rate of output per working age person (x100)
Independent variables (1) (2)
Constant 6.63 -8.69
(0.00) (0.06)
Ln of output per wor- -1.04 -1.56
king age person 1960 (0.00) (0.00)
Ln of youth depen- -3.05 -1.60
dency ratio (0.00) (0.03)
SOCINF 1.04 0.83
(0.01) (0.01)
Ln of life expectancy 5.14
at birth (0.00)
R2 0.45 0.67
Number of observations 97 97
aP{values are reported in parentheses below the coe±cient estimates.
bEstimation method is Fuller's modi¯ed LIML with the user-supplied Fuller parameter alpha set equal to
one, as has been suggested.
cIn regression (1) the instruments are ztropics, zsubtropics, zdestmp, zdestrp, lnFrankRom and EngLegal.
In regression (2) the instruments are the same, except that ln(1+ME) is added as further instrument.
26Table 3: Predicting annual average growth of output per working age person 2000-35
Percentiles (1) (2) (3) (1')
0.025 3.84 3.75 4.91 4.19
0.2 4.02 3.92 5.09 4.39
0.4 4.12 4.02 5.2 4.50
0.5 4.17 4.06 5.24 4.57
0.6 4.21 4.11 5.28 4.62
0.8 4.33 4.21 5.41 4.75
0.975 4.56 4.40 5.64 5.01
27Table 4: Number of years it would take India to reach the value of output per working age
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